The opposition parties' success in these elections provides evidence of the Pakistanis' discontent with President Musharraf. Frédéric Grare from the Carnegie Endowment points out that American and Musharraf's unpopularity often stem from the feeling that the US government merely used Musharraf as a tool to fight terrorism. A frequent argument for continuing the endorsement of the current Pakistani president-which has been put forward by American experts like Graham Allison, professor at Harvard University-is that only Musharraf would be able and willing to effectively fight the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other religious radicals. According to this argument, growing anti-American sentiments would therefore be a justified cost. In my opinion, these critics underestimate the fact that radicals benefit from Anti-Americanism and overestimate Musharraf's importance in the war on terror.
-He constantly refuses to allow American operations in the Northwestern Tribal Areas, which offer a safe haven for al-Qaeda leaders and their training camps.
-American military aid for the Pakistani army of approximately 1 billion USD annually did not produce the expected results: Bin Laden and other high-ranking terrorists have not been found, and the Pakistani Tribal Areas have partially replaced Afghanistan as al-Qaeda territory.
- Musharraf is mainly interested in maintaining his power: the attack on the Red Mosque, for instance, was in the opinion of several experts initiated to defend his presidential authority. The National Assembly election in 2002 was manipulated by the army under Musharraf's leadership: Religious parties won a great number of seats and American military aid was thus justified.
In order to improve its reputation with the Pakistani people and to prevent increased support of radicals like al-Qaeda, the USA must change its policies:
- America needs to accept that the Pakistani people want to change their government and it must therefore work together with Zardari's PPP and Sharif's PML-N. Both party leaders declared on March 9 that they were willing to form a government. It is likely that Musharraf will have to resign before the scheduled end of his term; even if he cooperates with oppositional parties as frequently promised, parliamentary pressure will be constantly high. Zardari and Sharif are in a position to cooperate with smaller parties and could either impeach Musharraf or reinstate the Supreme Court judges sacked by Musharraf in November 2007 during the state of emergency. These judges could then declare Musharraf's October 2007 election invalid. Thus, America's reputation in Pakistan would be best served through cooperation with the PPP and PML-N and reduced support for Musharraf.
- The USA must restructure its military aid. It should increase its control over how money is spent and be prepared to stop support if the Pakistani military wastes the aid or subverts American strategies out of self-interest. The amount of military aid being paid should depend on Pakistani successes in fighting terrorism. This is the only way to guarantee the Pakistani army's unlimited support in the War on Terror.
- Washington should enact a broader development aid program and support the democratic movements in Pakistan. Joshua Kurlantzick also suggested financingmedia outlets, lawyers' groups, public schools, student leaders, and other civil organizations in order to strengthen Pakistan's civil society.
Concluding, the United States has to reduce its support for Musharraf, respect the will of the Pakistani people, cooperate with the winners of the recent elections, change its form of military aid, and undertake measures to support democracy in Pakistan. It will thus ameliorate its standing in the region and alleviate the influence of radicals.
Manuel Weitnauer is an intern at the Atlantic Community's editorial team. Born and raised in Munich, he attends the University of Passau, where he is currently in his first year of Law studies.
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