Germany, France, Italy, and Austria entertain nationally determined, special relations to Russia and its state owned enterprise Gazprom. The company, which according to Moscow's plans, should soon be one of the largest in the world, has stakes in energy corporations both in old and new member states and in 15 of the pipelines on Europe's periphery.
In spite of the threat of "strategic encirclement" by Russia, Hungary and Bulgaria are contributing to the construction of two new pipelines running from Russia to Southern Europe. Belgrade has sold its energy network to Gazprom - thus securing Russian support regarding Kosovo - and Ankara is letting its state energy provider, Botas, build gas storage facilities in collaboration with the Russian giant.
According to the estimates of the International Energy Agency, declining extraction means EU gas consumption could nearly double by 2030. An EU-wide energy and foreign policy, which is true to its name, is therefore more necessary than ever before.
Today, other large customers such as China, Japan, and the United States welcome Russian deliveries. The fact that Moscow no longer solely relies on the Europeans for its foreign currency revenues provides the explanation for its imperial tone. The EU should react accordingly and develop a strategy of flexibility to replace the current orientation towards "integration" and "mutual dependency".
Europe's geographic situation is suitable to energy imports from a wide range of regions. Brussels has a geopolitical advantage over Beijing, Tokyo and Washington because the largest deposits of natural gas are on the edge of the EU (and simply need to be linked in to the European energy networks).
In five years, there should be three pipelines connecting Russia to Germany. Increased flexibility requires links to be developed to other regions. Already, Algeria supplies Southern Europe with two pipelines and covers over ten percent of European needs.
Besides North Africa, the EU should also turn to central and southern Africa. While Angola and Nigeria are already important providers, countries bordering the Gulf of Guinea will soon follow. China has been trading loans for raw materials for a long time and does so without demanding democracy or good governance in exchange.
Central Asia and the region surrounding the Caspian Sea are still largely absent from Europe's energy map. The large natural gas fields in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are all the more significant as Iran cannot be considered reliable.
In order to benefit from the energy wealth of the Caspian region, Brussels should especially support Austria and its south European partners Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Turkey. Indeed, as of 2013, a pipeline crossing Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan should supply central Europe and its branch lines could also lead to Egypt, Jordan, and Syria as well as Iran.
According to the plans of the Austrian operating company, the so-called Nabuco project will be better value for the money than the German-Russian Baltic Sea pipeline. A pipeline which bypasses Russia, connecting Baku to Ceyhan on the Mediterranean is already in use. This pipeline could also be supplied by Tehran and Bagdad in more tranquil, political times. Since the United States and Great Britain control this pipeline, a cooperation involving the whole of Europe would also, in this case, be possible. Finally, Iraq has agreed to deliver five billion cubic meters of gas to the EU over the next two to three years.
However, Brussels should also consider other means of transport. The construction of terminals to store liquefied gas provides an advantageous alternative since this enables the delivery of energy from regions that are too far away to be connected to Europe by means of pipelines.
This opens the door to other potential suppliers such as Qatar. While the Americans, Japanese, French, and increasingly the Chinese and the Indians are active in Doha, European capitals are only slowly discovering their geopolitical interests in the Middle East.
Europe too often stands in its own way and while Americans are blamed for waging war for oil and gas, the energy policy Europeans pursue is making them poorer by the year. As Charles de Gaulle once said, states do not have friends but only interests. This is nowhere more the case than in energy policy today.
Thomas Speckmann is consultant to the Office of the Governor of the Federal State of North-Rhine Westphalia and Assistant Lecturer at the seminar on political science and sociology of the University of Bonn.
This text was shortened and translated from German by the Atlantic Community Editorial Team and first appeared in German in Die Welt on July 8.
Related materials from the Atlantic Community:
- Michael T Klare: The Rise of the Petrosuperpowers
- Richard G Lugar: A Transatlantic Energy Security Strategy is Essential
- Andreas Goldthau: Rethinking Energy Inc.



July 24, 2008
Heinrich Bonnenberg, Energiewerke Nord
DGAP, Platinum Contributor (217)
Gas is used mainly for heating houses and warming water and its combustion produces CO2, too.
Electricity has to replace gas in this market. at best by using electrically driven heat pumps. That means we need more nuclear energy to produce electricity as renewable energy resources are scarce as well as expensive to use and burning coal produces CO2.