As each day brings Iran closer to possessing a nuclear weapons capability, a debate has developed over whether a nuclear-armed Iran can be deterred. Two differing strands of thought have emerged: on one side, conservatives like Norman Podhoretz have argued that Iran cannot be deterred, citing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s erratic rhetoric and raising the specter of a nuclear holocaust against Israel. Other analysts, in contrast, have suggested that Iran can, in fact, be deterred through the Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction. According to them, Iran is a rational state that would never jeopardize its own survival by launching a nuclear attack against countries with credible second-strike capabilities.
A nuclear-armed Iran would indeed be deterrable in the same sense that the Soviet Union once was: by knowing that initiating a nuclear strike will invite such destructive retaliation as to keep its aggression in check. But an Iran with nuclear weapons cannot be dealt with in a vacuum. An equally serious problem—one that Washington will have a much harder time preventing—is the tide of regional nuclear proliferation that is likely to result. Unfortunately, there are clear signs that this is already underway.
Thirteen states in the last year have declared an interest in pursuing their own nuclear programs, a reaction that many experts view as resulting from a perceived sense of insecurity. With Tehran continuing to stand firm on its efforts to enrich uranium, and with no negotiated settlement in sight, there appears to be a consensus throughout the region that Iran’s rising influence must be contained.
The Gulf Cooperation Council, for example, which consists of six Arab states located along the Persian Gulf, has recently announced plans to scrap its opposition to nuclear technology and develop a joint nuclear program. Meanwhile, Turkey has taken steps down a similar road. Just last week, Turkish President Abdullah Gul approved a law that paves the way for the construction of three nuclear power plants, with the first to be operational by 2012.
Egypt has also reinvigorated its nuclear plans, with Gamal Mubarak, the successor to the current ruler, positioning himself as the major proponent behind such an effort. Although Egyptian officials claim that such a program would be for peaceful purposes, the timing of a renewed interest in nuclear energy in Egypt and elsewhere across the region is suspect.
For obvious reasons, none of these countries have disclosed that their nuclear programs are designed for anything but energy production. Many analysts agree, however, that these second-tier programs constitute a hedging strategy designed to raise the stakes for Iran should it decide to weaponize its own program, giving other states in the region the technical option to quickly follow suit if they choose to.
It is clear that the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran go significantly beyond the possibility of a nuclear attack. The regional spillover that will result in the form of nuclear proliferation is an equally dangerous possibility, and one that should not be overlooked. An Iran with nuclear weapons is therefore not as simply dealt with as some analysts are suggesting. Deterrence is not enough to deal with the crisis; negotiations must, at all costs, be successful in discouraging Iran from building a bomb so as to avoid a nuclear free-for-all in the Middle East.
Matt Dupuis (left) is a recent graduate of Texas Lutheran University and now resides in Washington DC.
Jeb Koogler (right) is a student at Brown University.
They blog at Foreign Policy Watch .
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December 3, 2007
Lior Petek, University of St. Gallen, Gold Contributor (104)
The fact that deterrence does not work is not equivalent to the fact that military force in general is useless. Hence, for instance, the very premise led the current US administration to opt for preemptive and preventive warfare (see The White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, September 2002, especially p. 15; accessible at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf).