Britain has always been Europe's most militarily-capable power due to its
history of warfare, defence spending, but also proximity to the US. Like in
tennis so in military affairs, it pays off to play with a better partner and
Britain has learnt a lot from the US.
But something else seems to be happening. Countries once loyal to the
build-up of European defense and their military relationships with Germany are
turning towards Britain.
The Netherlands, for many years wedded to its military relationship with
Germany - the two armies even share equipment storages - is turning towards
London. Its Navy and Royal Marines have close links with their British
counterparts, forged in part by fighting the Taliban.
In Denmark, the centre-right government has gradually detached the country
from its traditional Nordic anchor and moved closer to London. "There is simply
no scope for cooperation with Denmark," a Swedish MP recently complained. Danish
soldiers, who in the 1990s deployed to the Balkans as part of a Nordic Battle
Group, now operate under British command both in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Europe's two most militarily-capable newcomers - Poland and Romania - are
also privileging links with Britain. Romanian soldiers serve under British
command, both on deployments and in key multinational exercises. Britain
provides an adviser to the Polish government to give advice on defence planning,
programming and budget management.
Britain's traditional military counterweight - France - has committed to
re-joining NATO and is likely to obtain changes inside the alliance and hopes to
get support for ESDP build-up.
But both these require Britain's support and French president Nicolas Sarkozy
has made it clear he hopes to cement an Anglo-French axis to generate a new
"critical mass" driving EU foreign and security policy when he makes a state
visit to Britain next week.
Germany, meanwhile, is turning increasingly inwards. It remains unwilling to
send the Bundeswher into combat in southern Afghanistan despite repeated US
entreaties, and its defense budget has declined almost continuously since
reunification; spending is only one percent of its GDP on defense, which puts it
at the bottom end of any NATO ranking. The two US-German army corps, created
in 1993, have been disbanded thus depriving the German army of the benefits of
interaction with the US army.
The turn towards London has also seen a return of the "Iraq caucus" inside
Europe - now more appropriately identified as the "RC South caucus" i.e. those
countries deployed as part of NATO's Regional Command South, which encompasses
the southernmost districts or provinces of Afghanistan. Led by Britain, this
caucus is driving NATO's Afghan policy and will determine the Alliance's
overarching Afghan plan, to be agreed at the Alliance's Bucharest Summit in
April.
But it may only be a matter of time before its discussions turn from one
theatre to joint exercises, cooperation on purchases and greater
interoperability. This represents a threat to the viability of both NATO and
ESDP on a number of levels.
- First, the concern used to be the gap between the US military and European armies. Today, the US has moved so far ahead in terms of capability and battle-field experience that European militaries cannot hope to catch up. The new danger is a clearer division inside Europe with the caucus on one side and the rest of Europe on the other.
- Second, as NATO's article V becomes increasingly meaningless - with so many allies refusing to come to others' aid in the fight again the Taliban - this caucus may develop a real, albeit unofficial, collective security guarantee.
These developments are not predetermined and if more countries move troops to
southern Afghanistan, as many analysts predict will happen after the US
presidential elections, the problem may go away.
Moreover, Britain had a similarly strong position in the early 1990s with all
the Eastern European countries, as London sponsored their NATO entrance, and
helped on defence reform. But the advantage was eroded because of British
skepticism about ESDP.
For now, however, the pendulum has swung towards London and the
reconfiguration of Europe's security landscape is a reality.
Daniel Korski is a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. A former British official, he was a Senior Advisor in the US State Department, and then led the Basra Reconstruction Team.
This article was originally written for the European Council on Foreign Relations and published here under the title "London Calling: How Britain now runs European security."
Related material from the Atlantic Community:
- Michael John Williams: EU Battlegroups March Europe Toward Common Defense
- Wess Mitchell: NATO's Unhappy Warriors
- D. Korski & M. Williams: The End of NATO and the Threat of US Unilateralism



April 1, 2008
Jeppe Plenge Trautner, Aalborg University / College of Europe, Bronze Contributor (14)
* The UK remains the only European state capable of providing military-strategic and operational level military leadership in tough missions, and several lesser European actors feel politically compelled to participate in such.
* French military leadership is capable but in transition, and are for various reasons (including a linguistic barrier, and partly non-NATO doctrines, materiel and orientations) not an attractive framework for other European states.
* The European Union, uncertain of its focus, mixes in climate change, trafficking, gender issues, crime and drugs with its military efforts, and is very unlikely to become a trusted player when the lives of soldiers are at risk.
* NATO is broken, not by the new players but due to political neglect and the destruction wrought on Art. V in 2003; while "its" soldiers are fighting for their lives in Southern Afghanistan the organisation itself is still very much in peace-time mode, and merely serves as a staff school for thousands of European officers lacking the military skills required for serving in operational roles.
The net results are British leadership, further demise of NATO into an officers club, and EU's ESDP at best growing into soft security 'doing the dishes' framework. Is this a problem?