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September 15, 2008

Marek Swierczynski, journalist at TVP, Diamond Contributor (1090)

The ideallistic approach that resonates in the article above does not take into account all factors and implications - and they're probably as much important as the core issue. Of course the military victory in Afghanistan is unlikely, and of course the situation there is far from stability, security or rule of law. The international community - or those countries involved militarily on the ground - will have to find new ways of assistance for the country that was always one of the most ungovernable regions on this planet. Chasing Osama bin Laden may never end until he dies of his own illnesses or in result of internal fights within al-Qaeda. And by the way it does not require a mass land forces but a good tip-off to get him. But havind said that, a quick withdrawal from Afghanistan would destabilize the region so much that nobody is ready to risk that move. Look at Pakistan, look at Iran. Both are to some extent threatened and secured by the US and NATO presence in Afghanistan. We've created a new regional strategy balance that is not to be undone soon, if we don't want to see al-Qaeda resurrect. But surely it's worth remembering that the most vicious cells have risen not far away in Hindukush but round the corner in Hamburg, Luton and in Madrid.

September 15, 2008

A Russian in Germany

I don't think Afghanistan is the problem, or the whole problem. The problem is its border, which cannot be secured.

It is sad to see that the US policy failed. Differently to cynical and selfish Europeans, Americans indeed tried to change the ways of life there for better. (I believe that future generations will pay respect to this great idealistic attempt of Bush's administration.)

This was rejected, and not only by the Islamic world. What next? Pull back to the secure borders and establish a sanitation cordon there? Where is that border? Is there any? Considering the nuclear threat from destabilized Pakistan, and in a short term perspective from Iran...

I have an idea. Maybe we should pass Afghanistan to China and Russia. Let them enjoy the multi-polar world!

September 17, 2008

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

"Of course the military victory in Afghanistan is unlikely"

Too often victory is defined in terms of being the equivalent of being 'V-E' day - unconditional surrender of the opponent.

In a conflict such as this victory isn't nearly as clear-cut. It usually comprises one of two thing; either a 'genocidal' victory - "they made a desert and called it peace", or some kind of settlement acceptable to both sides, as seems to have reached in the Sunni Triangle by methods that the likes of Dr. Lucke surely did not and does not agree with.

US forces made common cause with the Suni inhabitants, and between the two of them they killed or drove away the foreigners who called themselves Al Qaeda. Quelle horreur!

Of course Dr. Lucke may point out that one does not need to fight at all. Unfortunately that is an illusion. Not taking the fight to Afghanistan in 2001 would surely have emboldened many more terrorists and ensured the creation of more deserts like the site of the WTC buildings. Surely that was a desert of a kind, Dr. Lucke? Even if Usama bin Laden did not call it peace, but indeed promised more and better attacks at that time.

The choice then was whether to tolerate a postgraduate university of terrorism in a terrorist state or to invade. The coalition may not have won to date, but neither have we lost.

If there is one lesson to be learned from the relative success in Iraq, it is that victory conditions must be defined in terms which both the local people and the coalition can live with and gain from. In the Sunni Triangle local leaders took over governance of the area and gained peace, the US gained peace and reduced violence in an area which had been very violent.

I suspect such victories may be obtainable in local areas of Afghanistan upon a similar basis; local rule by local leaders acceptable to the populace rather than being imposed from on high, with non-toleration of schools of terrorism or terrorist forces being housed locally. Not generally, not at all the same time, but one area at a time.

It may take a while. Dr. Lucke represents a very large school of thought in Germany, what I might call the 'withdraw now' school. This school has held the view that Afghanistan is hopeless since the very beginning of the war, and it's influence in German politics has forced the German government into a condition of virtual paralysis which has caused major strain upon Germany;s relations with it's allies. Neverthless it is the strongly-held view of most Germans that not helping one's allies embroiled in a war is the highest moral duty and cause for celebration and self-commendation.

September 17, 2008

Marek Swierczynski, journalist at TVP, Diamond Contributor (1090)

Very little to add after Donald's note. Maybe only that the areas in which peace and stability are to be implemented in Afghanistan are much more complex than in Iraq in all relevant tersm, from geography to economy and ethnic composition. I agree with Don that the "victory" that we're aiming to achieve must be re-defined and tailor-made for local conditions. Otherwise we may keep on struggling in vain. I am not sure that NATO has trimmed down the "victory" prerequisites to the level of feasibility in the theatre.

September 17, 2008

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

"Maybe only that the areas in which peace and stability are to be implemented in Afghanistan are much more complex than in Iraq"

If you mean that there are more tribes and factions to deal with in Afghanistan, I agree. There is Pakistani meddling as well. But it's not impossible that the Pakistani involvement could be used to advantage because they are in fact outsiders in many areas of Afghanistan, as Al-Qaeda was in the Sunni Triangle.

But the changes in the Sunni Triangle mistkenly called 'surge' were implemented at the local level. That is it was local commanders and units working with local leaders who brought about the cooperation, not something laid down by General Petraeus in Bagdhad. His part in it was to lay down the policy that the local units would try to cooperate and to provide additional forces when needed to eliminate or push out pockets of Al Qaeda resistance. So the same approach might be viable in many parts of Afghanistan, if the coalition forces can be brought to cooperate. Even if coordination is difficult early on and buy-in cannot be secured, US forces could try such a strategy. If it works well that may persuade the allies of the merits, assuming it DOES work of course.

With the change in government in Pakistan it is possible that pressure can be brought on that end as well, although tribalism also is a problem in Pakistan.