In
evaluating the NATO-Afghanistan situation as a whole, it should not be
forgotten that the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit tasked the Secretary General with the
development of a new strategic concept, based for the first time on a
transparent and open public discussion.
Significantly,
this was the first time that the international community was given the chance
to assess confidential material at this level of command - later declassified
and published by the Washington Post - when ISAF Commander General Steven A.
McChrystal stepped out of NATO command under his US hat to deliver the material
to the national authority. This act proves that contemporary international
policy in the age of globalization is under the strict scrutiny of the media
and public opinion. Therefore, the decisive points of Afghan operations and the
enemy's center of gravity are publicly well known.
These facts
notwithstanding, NATO's public opinion campaign concerning the serious course
of action that should be undertaken regarding the war in Afghanistan is
insufficient. NATO and Non-NATO Troops Contributing Nations authorities face a
very hard decision and its time-frame is unclear due to the lack of nations'
support for the war.
R.
Chandrasekaran and G. Jaffe explain in the Washington
Post that "McChrystal
intends to use the 30,000 U.S. reinforcements authorized by Obama and as many
as 7,000 soldiers pledged by other NATO nations to protect key cities and towns
in the southern and eastern parts of the country, where the Taliban insurgency
is strongest. By focusing on securing population centers, he hopes to reverse
enemy momentum, foster more responsive local government and, where possible,
persuade Taliban fighters through a mixture of pressure and incentives to lay
down their arms." Thus, planning for who and when these
capabilities will be provided seems less problematic, since "Many of the things we are
talking about, we have already started," said Brig. Gen. John Nicholson,
who until last summer oversaw the military reconstruction effort in southern
Afghanistan.
In order to
avoid further waste of resources,
a few recommendations might be given:
- In light of the new US strategy, the operational concept for the ISAF mission should be revised. The NATO defense planning process should be directed towards a broader international community with the aim of altering base assumptions, with accurate assessments of the present strategic situation. It should show critical shortfalls and even a permanent lack of capabilities in some areas that hamper the completion of the ISAF mission.
- Allies deploying troops to ISAF follow the NATO Force Generation Process (FGP), which is viewed as a mechanism for improving overall capabilities. However, in reality, FGP often serves in the theater only as the mechanisim by which nations' flags show up, regardless of deployed troops' inability to conduct required tasks. This process also reqires urgernt review.
- Not all NATO members properly understood that the Afghan War is not only a US war: after 9/11, Article 5 was invoked by the consensus of all NATO Nations. Therefore, NATO Commanders must be covinced that they are doing the right job and National Contingents should follow ISAF operational plans.
It is worth stressing one extremely negative
and disheartening factor towards the accomplishment of the mission, officially
known as 'national caveats.'
Their presence creates a situation where National Contingent forces are hampered
by a lack of core capabilities to conduct planned tasks; and moreover, in
the international community, they undermine the fragile unity of command and of
effort.
Shaping the strategic and operational mission's
future by coordinating activities with IOs, NGOs, the NATO Training Mission,
and US-led Coalition Command with special focus on Afghan National Security
Forces development is therefore strongly recommended. NATO must understand that
now is the last chance to prove, and even enhance its credibility.
Dr. Eng Jerzy Deren is a retired colonel conducting independent research
on international security and a visiting professor. He dealt with strategic
planning and spent several years in hot spot regions with the UN, OSCE and
NATO, including SME post with NATO's advisory team to Afghan Minister of
Defence A.R. Wardak. He contributed to development of the Afghan National
Security System.
Related Materian from Atlantic Community:
- Jorge Benitez: Next Step for NATO: Cohesion After Bratislava
- Sebastian Bruns: Rasmussen Set to Reinvigorate NATO
- Christopher Lee Davis: Think Tank Analysis: Five Steps for Success in Afghanistan
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January 7, 2010
Tobias P. Fella, AsiaStudies.de, Silver Contributor (45)
I think your right, more efforts have to me made in the realm of so called 'strategic communication' to not only prepare the Afghan public but also a skeptical domestic audience for a changing operation reality. Sometimes, counterinsurgency campaigns are lost at the 'home front'.
So a shift is necessary to enhance and also to improve ISAF's efforts at public diplomacy and strategic communications. The trust of the Afghan public in the ISAF must be restored. This is a critical pillar of success in Afghanistan and therefore must be a top priority for ISAF and NATO.
Of course, better strategic communications or public diplomacy cannot stubstitute for better policy, but they can help ISAF to reconnect with moderates and reform-oriented Afghan people, who share an interest in transforming the country and fighting radical militants.
However I am a little itchy about the expression of 'strategic communication'. That is, the process of selecting, framing, and sharing information to create a favorable climate in which to advance the West's interests and objectives. It sounds like an oxymoron to me, strategic and communication.