Grounds for Involvement
Today the German Bundeswehr is deployed all over the world. In addition to its national defense tasks, it is now involved in crisis response and management.
Under the Schröder administration, the government explicitly stated that in military deployments abroad, the Bundeswehr would primarily serve in peace and security efforts, and would only do so after the utility and sensibility of individual cases were discussed. Military tools alone, however, can never solve a conflict: they require accompanying measures. Conflict-stabilizing operations serve to establish the necessary space and time to develop political solutions. Military operations abroad must therefore always be embedded in a broader political framework that combines both military and political tools, especially in development policy.
Evaluating Progress
Because of this, an assessment of the Bundeswehr’s deployment in Afghanistan is fraught with ambiguity. Alongside numerous improvements in the framework of the ISAF mandate, there are also areas where positive results have been insufficient or altogether nonexistent. The security situation, especially outside of Kabul, is extremely tense. There has been an increase in politically motivated attacks, particularly in the south and the east. The most recent attacks suggest that it is also becoming increasingly dangerous for foreign troops in the north and the west. The cultivation of drugs and increase in crime present further threats.
In general, President Karzai must accept the criticism that regional warlords—among them war criminals—have too much influence in the parliament and the provinces. These conditions are exacerbated by ineffective and corrupt state institutions in many regions, which undermine the people’s trust in the government and in foreign peacekeeping forces.
ISAF vs. OEF
An honest assessment of “Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)” is far less positive than that of the ISAF-mandate’s agenda and goals. Though the necessity of a military component in Afghanistan remains undisputed, both operations now seem increasingly incompatible. The mandate’s legitimacy is in question: how long does the right of self-defense remain legitimate? The affiliation of ISAF and OEF-troops is becoming increasingly ambiguous, and not only for the Afghan population. Reports of uncoordinated military action among troops in Afghanistan are on the rise, and the coordination of command between the two operations is growing more difficult.
The task of the international community has therefore not yet been achieved; insecurity and violence still hinder progress in Afghanistan. But is this a sensible reason to withdraw?
Difficult Questions
The Taliban have been given a boost by the West’s wavering commitment to the country. Military counterterrorism efforts, at least as they exist under the umbrella of OEF in Afghanistan, are not succeeding. Nonetheless, we still have a strong interest in preventing Afghanistan from once again becoming a haven for international terrorists.
We must ask ourselves whether OEF—as an operation of the so-called “coalition of the willing” under American leadership—is still a sustainable model for engagement in Afghanistan and beyond.
Niels Annen has been a Social Democrat member of the German Parliament since 2005. He is a member of the SPD party leadership and deputy chair of the democratic forum Linke 21.
Related Materials from the Atlantic Community
- Karsten Voigt argues that Withdrawing German Troops Could Destabilize Northern Afghanistan
- Executive Summary - How the EU Could Do More in Afghanistan
- Karsten Voigt declares Germany’s Open-Ended Commitment to Afghanistan
- Canada Assesses Pitfalls and Progress in Afghanistan



July 20, 2007
Valentina Klausen, -, Silver Contributor (33)