The US huffs and puffs with big words, but has nothing much to offer except a visit from their Secretary of State to Tbilisi and the vague threat that US-Russian relations could be seriously damaged.French President Sarkozy pretends it is he who, on behalf of the European Union, has brokered a peace pla to end the conflict. But Moscow merely allowed him to adorn a Russian diktat with European trimmings. And if Poland, shocked by the events in Tbilisi, now agrees to the stationing of US anti-missile weapons on her territory, it might provide some reassurance to a nervous people, but it will not do anything to moderate Moscow's power politics on the Russian periphery.

Those who qualify as make-believe strategists are also those who claim that Berlin and Paris encouraged Russia's actions in the Caucasus by refusing to offer Georgia a NATO Membership Action Plan last spring. They seem to have overlooked that in this part of the world, Russia held all the leverage in the first place; hence the plan to go ahead with Georgia's NATO-membership against Russia's will was half-baked from the start. Had NATO gone through with the project that the Bush administration proposed, and prepared for Georgia's NATO membership, this would not have reduced Russian pressure on Georgia but, on the contrary, increased it further without providing the West with any realistic countering options.

Instead of fooling themselves and their citizens, European governments should now soberly assess the lessons from the Caucasus crisis. Maybe then they will arrive at a workable strategy for their future relationship with Russia.

1. Everyone in the West, including those states in Eastern Europe that were once pressured into the Soviet Empire, has to learn to get along with Russia. This requires respect for Russian interests, the clear formulation of their own interests as well as an openness toward common ones. It so happens that Western interests in close cooperation with Russia - on such important issues as energy security, environmental conservation, prevention of nuclear proliferation, or stabilization of Afghanistan - are generally stronger than those of demarcation or defense against Russia.
   
   
2. Where Russian interests clash with those of the West, e.g., in the Caucasus, it makes much better sense to find common ground than to engage in confrontation. This will not always be successful, neither in respect to the Caucasus nor to Ukraine's sovereignty and relations with the West. But to oppose Russia in those situations only promises success if the West is holding the better cards. This would also be a condition for Russia's willingness to compromise.
   
   
3. Domestic political developments within Russia are largely beyond Western influence. Therefore, Western efforts have to focus on influencing Moscow's international behavior. So far, these efforts have not entirely been without success because they can play on Russia's own interests. Putin's Russia is not the Soviet Union. Unlike the old Kremlin, the new one recognizes that pursuing the country's external interests depends on a functioning network of international relationships, and that requires the key players to observe specific rules. To remind Moscow to honor these rules, also in its relations with the states on Russia's periphery such as Georgia, will be more promising than empty gestures of threat and defiance.
   

Admittedly, even the best strategy will fail as long as the Europeans cannot agree among themselves. Moscow will then have the upper hand, can pick and choose its preferential partners, and play one off against the other. Then make-believe strategies will be the only ones available when the next crisis with Russia occurs.

Unfortunately, the probability for such an outcome remains high. The way different European governments reacted to the events in Georgia highlighted once again the schism between the ‘old' and ‘new' Europe that Donald Rumsfeld had sketched out in the context of the Iraq war a few years back. When will the countries of old Europe - Germany, France, Spain and Italy - ever learn that even though each one of them may be able to achieve economic benefits in bilateral deals with Moscow, they simply do not have enough leverage on their own to influence Russian foreign policy? When will those of new Europe - Poland and the Baltic Nations - finally realize that they can prevent consensus within the EU, but they cannot stop the bigger EU states from by-passing them in making arrangements with Russia alone?

Dr. Christoph Betram is the former editor of the Politics section of "Die Zeit." He was also the director at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London as well as the Stiftung Wissenshaft und Politik in Berlin and is a member of the advisory board for the Atlantic Community.

This text was translated from German by the Atlantic Community Editorial Team. It first appeared here in German in "Die Zeit" on August 19, 2008 and is reprinted with permission from the author.