This may be a
turning point in Russia's relations with the US and western Europe. Aggression
against Georgia has disillusioned decision makers and the public about whether
Putin's Russia is a peace-loving nation. Implications may be widespread, the
first one being stronger American committment to placing missile defence shieldin
the countries of the former soviet-bloc.
Military action
against Georgia - however limited in time, scale and impact it may have seemed
from Moscow's point of view - was a symbolic resurrection of Russia's imperial
ambitions and a single handed return to the status of a world super-power,
enjoyed for the last two decades only by the US. While the Western leaders have
desperately tried to stop the war in what is regarded one of the world's most
fragile powder kegs, intellectual elites promoting friendly ties with the
Kremlin, were stupefied. If politics, as many claim, is made on TVRussian tanks and armoured vehicles have inflicted
more damage on Moscow than on Gori. Images of war can strike harder than bombs
and bullets - and Russia did not convince the West it was right to asisst
Georgia's breakaway provinces militarily.
Technically
Russia won the war, but paradoxically, the victory will weaken Russia's
position towards its western partners, primarily the US. And most probably it
will evoke the cold war attitudes and open a "cold peace" - a period of
mounting distrust, prejudice and criticism of Russian policies, which in recent
years was set aside by an overwhelming wave of appeasement. A change is
inevitable.
The first sign of
the change is the missile defence deal between Poland and the US. Even if decision
makers claim that the agreement was ready before August the 8th, there's little
doubt that the war helped to strike the deal, after many thought an agreement was
not possible in the near future. As a result, central and eastern Europe could
face local arms build-up and possible hostile relocations of forces, but after the
crisis in Georgia the public sympathy is on the side of missile defence shield.
Deterioration in
political relations with Russia is obvious, but Europe has to try its best so
as not to deepen the energy crisis, as it is largely dependant on Russian
supplies. But in case of Georgia, Russia has demonstrated that it will not only
use energy as a weapon but that it is also prepare to strike militarily. From
now on, Europe will seek its energy independence more seriously and plans to
develop nuclear power-plants and the search for alternative fuel sources in
countries leading the anti-Russian camp will experience a boost.
Transatlantic
partnership will only gain from the Georgian crisis. Criticism of the
US-sponsorship of a maverick leader Saakashvili pales in comparison to
unprecedented actions by post-soviet Moscow. Even if Europeans do not claim
"We are all Georgians," they share the general view of the US that it is
Russia who deserved to be punished. Remarkably, chancellor Merkel in Tbilisi
repeated the clause from Bucharest - that Georgia is still on its way to NATO
membership. A perfect timing to annoy Russia.
A symbolic date - 08.08.08 - may be remembered just as 9/11, and not as
the date when Beijing Olympic Games started. Whether its repercussions will
change the world as much as 9/11 did, is a very serious question, especially
for us in Europe.
Marek Swierczynski is a journalist with a special interest in defence and security matters and and a member of the Polish Euro-Atlantic Society.
Related materials from the Atlantic Community:
- Wess Mitchell: How America Should Respond to Resurgent Russia
- Richard Holbrooke and Ronald D. Asmus: Only Transatlantic Unity Can Stop This War
- Nicholas Kirrill Gvosdev: The Transatlantic Divide Over the Caucasus Conflict
- 20
August 19, 2008
Ben Lombardi, Strategic Analysis, Defence Research and Development Canada - Centre for Operational Analysis, (3)
The Anglosphere (US, UK and Canada) and some of the former Warsaw Pact members who are now in NATO argue for a strong, if measured, reaction to the events in the Caucasus. France, Germany, Italy and others are rather more comfortable with events, have confined themselves to rhetorical indignation, and are far more interested in insulating themselves from any deterioration in Moscow's relations with Washington.
The emergence of such differences is probably inevitable, as Europe's strategic relevance continues to fade. With very limited military capabilities that almost all (save the UK) are unable to project much beyond their borders (for whatever reasons), and increasingly dependent on Russia for its energy needs, what else can the Europeans do? Winter is coming, their national economies are slowing, and the last thing that these governments want is to be confronted by heightened east-west tensions and a threatened cut in energy supplies. What kind of sanctions could NATO-Europe or the EU apply to Russia that Moscow would greatly fear without harming the core interests of so many key member-states? The Poles and the Balts are operating within a different political calculus, and this is revealed by Warsaw's agreement on BMD, but those countries do not carry sufficient weight within NATO or the EU to make much of a difference. They will not sway Paris or Berlin or Rome, even if they side with Washington.
After the dust has cleared, we might well look back on the Russian attack as a very clever use of military force to advance several foreign policy objectives. First, it humbles Georgia in a manner that cannot be disputed: Tbilisi has been shown to be utterly impotent and its vaunted pro-Western partnerships of little help. That is useful domestically for Putin and Medvedev, but it also sends a message to the entire region. Brussels now knows that advocating NATO membership for some of these countries will be accompanied by a very high price. Beyond declaratory policy, it remains to be seen if NATO-Europe, or even Washington, has the stomach to continue to keep the Alliance's door open. Second, Moscow might have further revealed the deep fissures within the Western Alliance. Those are already evident as a result of Afghanistan and Iraq, but in this case no one in the governments of NATO-Europe can seriously fault Washington -- although attempts to do so have already been made in the European press. Given the performance of President Sarkozy, whose ceasefire failed even to mention Georgia's territorial integrity, or Chancellor Merkel, whose government led the opposition to extending MAPS to Georgia and Ukraine at the Bucharest Summit earlier this year, critics of NATO in Washington will likely continue to wonder about the continuing relevance of the Alliance.
This short note is the reverse of what Mr. Swiercznski wrote, but is not meant to be a categorical rejection of his views. He might well be proven correct. My own gut feeling, however, is that it is too soon to know what is going to happen and we ought not to assume that Russia has solved some of the West's own problems (such as intra-Alliance disarray) by its actions in Georgia. Instead, those problems could well have been made worse.