The paper is an attempt to analyse the apparent failure of US counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq by taking into account the psychological mechanisms of attitude formation, need theory and conflict dynamics. Analysed will be first the attitudes of two populations currently interacting on the ground in Iraq, Iraqis and American soldiers, followed by a discussion of their possible mutual effect on cooperative conflict resolution strategies. It is discerned that the primary reason for the breakdown of American-Iraqi relations are discriminatory processes of moral exclusion at the individual as well as institutional level, which have the effect of denying Iraqis fulfilment of both, their biological and psychological needs. To clarify the argument, examples will be given of symptoms of moral exclusion currently practiced by the occupiers. Lastly, some suggestions will briefly be made as to strategies that could be employed to bridge the current gap between the Iraqis and their occupiers, followed by a short prediction of whether such strategies are likely to be acted upon in the near future.