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In the course of the American-led war on Iraq in 2003 and the intensification of the Iranian nuclear crisis, weapons of mass destruction have become a major issue in international affairs. The terrorist attacks of September 11^th 2001 in Washington, D.C., and New York have commonly been considered triggers for the significant change visible in US non-proliferation policy. Contrary to this widespread view, Herbert Maier argues that the diagnosed unilateral course as well as the abandonment of multilateral approaches and the increased importance of military force and coercion in US non-proliferation and foreign policy in general have been visible since the early 1990s.

The author's assumption: Since the end of the Cold War, proliferation has become a core issue of world order. Therefore, Washington's ability to design world order has strongly been affected. Consequently, the US has become much more inclined to adjust its non-proliferation tools to vital interests and major foreign policy goals. The author's thesis: The US pursues a unilateral non-proliferation policy emphasizing military elements and the use of force whenever it is convinced that multilateral action within existing or potential international regimes does not work any more. In lieu thereof Washington focuses on freedom of action and the activ e fight against proliferation. In terms of theory, the study is based on neo-classical realism. This approach tries to connect neorealist assumptions with others and wants to establish a dynamic concept which is needed to analyze change in foreign policy.

In order to capture policy change and its reasons, Herbert Maier analyzes the United States's behavior in four non-proliferation regimes: the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. Moreover, the author examines three military and strategic tools to counter proliferation: nuclear deterrence, missile defense and military pre-emption. The thesis concludes that the George W. Bush administration was more a catalyst than an initiator of change in US strategy. The unilateral reflex, which is mainly tied to President George W. Bush, was already visible during the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994, for example. Since then the US has increasingly disdained American multilateral commitments and thwarted efforts to strengthen non-proliferation regimes.

The author concludes that the equation "rise of power equals expansion of interests" is not inevitable. Rather, perceptions of the international system and its incentives for the relevant actors determine foreign policy outcomes.

Dr Herbert Maier is an assistant professor at the University of Regensburg.

This is an abstact of his PhD thesis published in German under the title „Massenvernichtungswaffen und Weltordnung. Der Wandel der Nichtverbreitungspolitik der USA seit dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts" in Hamburg in 2007.

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