Jan Neutze, German Marshall Fund of the United States
As a program officer in the foreign policy program at the German Marshall Fund in Washington DC, Jan Neutze works on a range of transatlantic foreign policy issues both by managing relationships with GMF's partner institutions and by developing GMF's foreign policy programming. He received his MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and holds a German law degree from the University of Münster.
1. What are your priorities in your work at the German Marshall Fund of the United States?
GMF’s mission is "strengthening transatlantic cooperation" – we work on a range of transatlantic public policy issues with an emphasis on those areas (the role of NATO, climate change, immigration, the Balkans and the Black Sea region, etc.) where we see a particular need to foster dialogue between Europeans and Americans. GMF uses a variety of programs to create space for dialogue, often by bringing together a range of experts on a certain issue, both at major events such as the annual Brussels Forum and at smaller expert roundtable discussions in one of our eight offices.
One of GMF’s core objectives remains grant-making to support a wide range of institutions and fellows working on transatlantic public policy issues. Given the growth of GMF over recent years, we also provide our own research and analyses (such as the annual Transatlantic Trends survey) on transatlantic issues ranging from NATO-expansion to immigration and climate change. My own priorities at GMF’s foreign policy program are to help build the foreign policy profile of the institution by focusing on current transatlantic foreign policy debates (such as NATO’s role in Afghanistan, differing transatlantic perceptions on the use of force and the fight against terrorism).
GMF provides me with the unique opportunity to work on these issues in partnership with other top-notch institutions in the US and Europe. I am convinced that fostering these networks of transatlantic thinkers and opinion-makers not only strengthens the relationship between the US and Europe in general, but also provides intellectual input outside the realm of government that can avert conflict and in turn inform policy decisions.
2. What do you see as the main implications of the US election for transatlantic relations?
2009 will be a critical year for transatlantic relations as Americans will have elected a new president. Following the A-B-C ("anything but Clinton") policy that guided much of the initial Bush-administration approach to policy-making, we will likely see an A-B-W ("anything but George W. Bush") approach from whoever may be the next commander-in-chief.
Yet, regardless of whether a Democrat or a Republican will control the White House, Europeans will soon have to realize that many of the key foreign problems of the last eight years are still there – and they are unlikely to disappear anytime soon. One of the key tests for the new US administration will thus be how to enlist Europe’s support in achieving the desired results. With Bush gone, will European leaders suddenly provide more support for stabilizing Iraq? Certainly not! Will Germany, Italy, and France re-double there efforts in Afghanistan as a sign of "good-will" toward the new president? Unlikely! And will Europeans support a more robust containment policy vis-à-vis increasingly assertive states like Russia and China? Doubtful!
The key for the new US administration will thus be to leverage its political "seed capital" with Europeans in a way that extracts maximum concessions (increased burden-sharing in Afghanistan, unified positions on Russia and Iran) while meeting Europeans half-way on issues that matter most to them (and should quite frankly also matter to the United States), such as climate change, energy security, and renewed efforts for peace in the middle East. In doing so, it will become more difficult for Europe’s leaders to simply say "no" to requests coming from a President Obama/Clinton/McCain – compared to what most Europeans perceived as "bullying" by the Bush administration which continues to be highly unpopular in Europe. While the foreign policy challenges won’t be resolved by the time the next US President takes the oath of office, 2009 could provide a key opportunity to renew the transatlantic partnership and to jointly tackle these challenges at an unprecedented level of cooperation.
3. What is the greatest challenge to the transatlantic relationship today?
US and European policymakers agree that the transatlantic relationship today is no longer about pacifying Europe but about addressing "global challenges" together. While this cooperation is taking place on a range of issues, many Europeans believe that this collaboration would be more effective if the United States had a stronger comittment to international law and a more multilateralist foreign policy.
For most Europeans, the United Nations remains the bedrock of international legitimacy and the principal approval body for the use of force – while distaste for international treaties and for the UN framework in general is particularly developed within the current US administration. While the stark disputes over the invasion of Iraq have been papered over, the underlying differences between Americans and Europeans remain. Transatlantic clashes such as in 2002/2003 over invading Iraq loom in the future if a transatlantic consensus about the role of international law – and particularly the use of force – is not met.
In recent years, the public on both sides of the Atlantic are consistently reminded that no policy disagreement is too severe for the transatlantic relationship as we are "a community of values, bound by common heritage and history." Continuous disagreements over the role and utility of international law and international institutions, however, have the potential to create a value-gap. Addressing these differences will require working out a transatlantic consensus at the highest levels on a number of issues: the utility of the UN and concrete agreement to reform it; the role of international law – specifically the use of force – and a mutual understanding of whether and how to update its interpretation; and a general commitment to the primacy of multilateralism – or the multilateralist imperative – as one European ambassador in Washington, DC recently described it. This discussion needs to be not just transatlantic in scope but intra-European as well. It should not be forgotten, that the "letter of the eight," which expressed support for US-led regime change in Iraq, was signed by five out of fifteen EU member countries.
This underscores the lack of a unified European approach to the role of international law. Acting within the framework of international law, however, is a critical requirement for both sides as it represents the core values of the enlightenment on which the transatlantic partnership rests and what distinguishes the US and Europe from many other places in the world. Thus, resolving differences over international law and the use of force and ensuring that the US and Europe remain a community of values is one of the greatest challenges facing the transatlantic relationship today.
The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the German Marshall Fund.
Related Materials from the Atlantic Community:
- James Cricks: Don't Forget America
- Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Editor of The National Interest
- Scott T. Paul: The US Must Show Its Commitment to International Law
Fri, Mar 21st 2008, 09:41
ilyas m mohsin, ppp, Platinum Contributor (250)
As rightly pointed out by Mr.Neutze, the major casualty of the last eight years has been the UN/ International Law besides the helpless millions killed etc by the US occupation/ operations in these areas. Nobody would have sympathy for the extremists if the ‘war on terror’ was conducted within the ambit of the International Norms. The highhanded policies have tended to create some sympathy for the extremists among people who do not even like but who start to hate the arrogance of power of the superpower.
Mr. Neutze, like most G-8 scholars, has tended to ignore the importance of associating the intellectuals in the brain-storming about the current mess from the amongst those who are at the receiving end for the last 8 years. As a friend of the US, I would urge him to do the same as such gestures would help the return of Normalcy and counter, generally, the near-East Syndrome which ahs already developed. Its unfortunate proof is the high percentage of suicides by the American soldiers in Iraq which is doubly unfortunate as most of those dying are from straitened backgrounds. Their tragic deaths in combat/ suicides does little to improve US’ position.