Sarkozy l' Américain?

Gaelle Fisher

The election of Nicolas Sarkozy was a source of hope for the future of Franco-American and transatlantic relations. Sarkozy made no secret of his intention to kick start a new era of French foreign policy and effect a radical break away from a forty year old Gaullist anti-American tradition, loyally held up by his predecessor Jacques Chirac. Now nearly a year has gone by since the proclaimed “rupture” and in July France will assume the European presidency. Has “Sarkozy l’Américain” truly improved the state of transatlantic relations and earned his reputation as the most pro-American president France has ever had?

PRO:

• Pro-American Rhetoric
  Braving the current of French popular opinion, Sarkozy acknowledges that France has little to gain from systematically opposing the United States. A pro-American approach enables France to voice its visions of the international order. The shift was made explicit as early as May 6, 2007 on the evening of his electoral victory: “I want to reach out to our American friends to tell them they can count on our friendship […] I want to tell them that France will always be on their side when they need her …” Sarkozy’s visit to the United States in November 2007 gave the president the opportunity to express his admiration for the US and emerge as the new central partner for Washington in Europe after Blair’s departure. His advisory and parliamentary staff has contributed to the political rapprochement. His foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, is famously transatlanticist. The president’s major foreign policy advisor, Jean David Levitte, spent the last years working on calming the transatlantic storm in his capacity as French ambassador to Washington and has successfully helped the president rebuild strong transatlantic relations.
  
  
• Geostrategic Conversion
  Rapprochement of the two nations has been facilitated by Sarkozy and Kouchner’s support of the United States’ tough line regarding Iran’s nuclear program. This contrasts with other European leaders’ positions as well as Chirac’s earlier cautious approach to conflicts and tensions in the Greater Middle East. Sarkozy additionally shares Washington’s serious take on security threats to Israel and its critical posture towards Russia and China, especially with regard to their human rights records and their perceived unfair and imbalanced trade policies.
  
  
• Military Rapprochement
  Sarkozy has agreed to increase France’s contribution to the war effort in Afghanistan by adding 1500 to 1700 to the existing French contingent of 1600, sending combat troops to the East, and providing military arsenal. Yet the main new element of French military cooperation with the United States is Sarkozy’s commitment to reintegrating France into NATO’s military wing. He announced this bold step at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in early April. In exchange for rejoining, Sarkozy is likely to demand France be granted control of a key NATO command.

CON:

• Sarkozy the “Old European”
  One element of continued French “Anti-Americanism” is Sarkozy’s alignment with the policies of “Old Europe.” At the NATO Summit in Bucharest, he sided with Germany, Britain, and Spain in their opposition to Bush’s plan to offer MAPs to Ukraine and Georgia which revealed the limits of his support to Washington. He does not ignore that “Old Europe” remains tied together by common geostrategic challenges and interests that can conflict with America’s international objectives. The breach between the Bush administration and “Old Europe” is particularly evident regarding climate change. The war in Iraq also remains a thorn in the relationship between France and the United States since Chirac’s applauded rejection of military involvement in 2003. In addition, Sarkozy holds Washington responsible for the weakness of the dollar and blames the US for not acting to combat the crisis efficiently enough, thereby harming French foreign trade.
  
  
• A Split Commitment: NATO-ESDP
  Despite Sarkozy’s praise of NATO, it can be argued that he merely views the Alliance as a tool to strengthen France’s military capacity and global involvement. By endorsing full membership of NATO, he may be hoping to restrict it to a role which leaves room for the development of a parallel and counterbalancing European Security and Defense Policy. This is why Sarkozy demanded US endorsement of the ESDP in exchange for France rejoining the military structures of NATO. A few days before the Bucharest Summit, Sarkozy paid a short visit to the UK to secure Gordon Brown’s endorsement of the ESDP. Committing to NATO proved necessary to negotiate with the Americans and the British since both fear that the ESDP could become a rival to NATO if France did not rejoin.
  
  
• French Unilateralism
  Sarkozy's unilateral foreign policy has hindered transatlantic progress within the last year and antagonized both his European and international partners. Among other things, Sarkozy acted in Darfur before the international community could decide on a common strategy; he carried out nuclear agreements with states such as the United Arab Emirates without involving the US; and finally, he welcomed the Libyan Colonel Gaddafi in Paris although the dictator’s credentials are still highly questionable. On the European level too, many of Sarkozy’s initiatives have been unilateral. These include the proposal of a mini-treaty instead of the European Constitution in September 2006, the re-discussion of the Turkish question, and the forcing of the Mediterranean Union. In the light of Sarkozy’s prioritization of national interests, these elements of his foreign policy seem less dictated by the intention to revive transatlantic relations or the promotion of multilateralism than by the aim of restoring France’s great power status.

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Gaelle Fisher is a graduate in German and History from UCL and an intern at the Atlantic Community.