Atlantic Community:Open Think Tank Article ""The Axis of Good": Iran and Venezuela"

"The Axis of Good": Iran and Venezuela

Christian Rieck and Dustin Dehez: We argue that the growing public relationship between Iran and Venezuela is more a game of smoke and mirrors than a substantial threat. The US and EU must avoid rising to propaganda’s bait and continue dealing with Ahmadinejad and Chavez individually, bearing in mind that “if pushed too hard, even unlikely bedfellows can become a happy couple.”

Iran and Venezuela have established a “revolutionary partnership” that speaks the language of Anti-Americanism and is funded by vast resource revenues. But just how dangerous is this self-proclaimed “alliance of revolutionary brother-nations,” this “Axis of Good,” as Chávez calls his like-minded allies? A closer look at the two “rogue states” reveals more differences than similarities and calls the true nature of their partnership into question.

Regional Power—Or Lack Of It
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s policy concentrates on extending Iranian influence in Iraq and among the Shia communities in the region, while perpetuating current regional power through an ambitious nuclear program. But attempts to strengthen the Shia communities in the Middle East have increased Tehran’s isolation. Damascus is its only steadfast ally at present, and this Syrian alliance has no ideological basis: any increase in Shia/Sunni tensions would threaten Assad’s own power base. And former Iran proxy Hezbollah sees itself increasingly as not just an instrument in the war against Israel, but a political force within Lebanon—a development that makes it more independent from Tehran’s influence.

Chávez is pursuing more pragmatic policies in comparison. Venezuela has a string of allies in its own region: Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba, and to a lesser degree Ecuador and Argentina. Yet in all of these countries important opposition groups exist that denounce Chávez’s cross-border influence. Even though Chávez has successfully established a new regional leftist political discourse and has wrested the regional agenda-setting power from Brazil’s Lula, the “Bolivarian revolution” is still a minority view in Latin America.

Separate Aims and Motivations
Chávez has regardless become the new icon of the Latin Left, imitating Fidel Castro in his symbolism and rhetoric. His Bolivarianism aims to form a regional alliance of left-wing countries to contain the influence of the United States. The emphasis on regional integration and social development clearly sets Venezuela’s agenda apart from Iran’s. Chávez’s neighborhood is stable, the aims of the “revolution” are widely shared, the economic links—even with the US—are excellent. Venezuela wants to lead, not dominate. Caracas’ “national project” is a social cause rather than a military one.

In contrast, Tehran’s aim to develop a nuclear option is motivated by a desire to replace the United States as the regional power broker and render retaliation impossible. And Iran’s regional neighbors look increasingly unfriendly: Sunni-dominated states such as Jordan and the United Arab Emirates are beginning to look to Saudi Arabia for regional leadership to contain Iranian influence.

Should We Be Concerned?
Even if the bond between the Iran and Venezuela is more propaganda than substance, the trend towards closer cooperation of the “rogues” is indeed problematic, and the transatlantic partners must show the rest of the world that these partnerships are inherently unsustainable.

Next Steps

1) The US and EU should continue their policy of “reason and restraint” with Venezuela and not escalate rhetoric. Venezuela has no “oil weapon” against the US: Proximity, security and Venezuelan involvement in downstream US infrastructure obviate the possibility of such threats.

2) The EU and the US should foster an alliance among neighboring Latin American countries to address their concerns and contain the Venezuelan influence that is detrimental to democracy in the region. Chávez knows that democracy is his Achilles’ heel. His regional meddling not only violates political and constitutional consensus, but also international law.

3) A settlement between Syria, Israel and the West would increase political pressure on Ahmadinejad and weaken Tehran’s connections to its only ally in the region. It would also help to quash Iranian aspirations to hegemony in the Middle East.

4) The EU should reconsider its position on stronger sanctions on Tehran. It is becoming increasingly clear that Iran’s unwillingness to compromise is not for gaining more leverage in the negotiations, but rather to complete its nuclear program.

5) Iran’s and Venezuela’s intensive travel diplomacy—their official rhetoric and show of unity to strengthen ties and reach out to other “rogues”—must be monitored carefully. The potential for cooperation is there, whether or not it is sustainable.

The transatlantic partners must deal with the members of the “Axis of Good” individually, but should calibrate their responses according to relationships among these erstwhile “rogue states.” If pushed too hard, even unlikely bedfellows can become a happy couple.

Christian E. Rieck is project assistant in the International Cooperation Department of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (KAS) and Editor Latin America of the World Security Network (WSN). He is also a lecturer at Humboldt-Universität Berlin and member of the KAS Working Group on Foreign Policy.

Dustin Dehéz is Director for Northeast African Studies at the Düsseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy (DIAS), where he also contributes to the Department on the Middle East. He is also a member of the KAS Working Group on Foreign Policy.

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Comments

October 18, 2007

Jason John Blackstock, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, (10)

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Dear Christian and Dustin,

Your key message of this piece -- that the Iran-Venezuela link is simply media bluster -- is certainly correct. However there are two issues I wanted to raise.

1) Throughout the article you assert that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is driving Iranian policy. However this seems a very significant over-statement of his role with the Iranian political hierarchy. The Office of the President of Iran is far less powerful in policy terms than you give him credit for -- most significant policy making power rests with the mullahs though the 'Supreme Leader' (Ayatollah Khamenei) and the Expediency Council.

(A very rudimentary outline of the structure is available on the BBC website at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/htm... )

What Ahmadinejad does have is a bully pulpit and media exposure (particularly courtesy of Western media) which he uses to both stoke anti-American sentiment in Iran and to exacerbate US-Iranian tensions (through media tricks like hugging Chåvez). But this doesn't mean that the statements he makes actually reflect the policy of the Iranian regime. My question on this regard is: aren't you giving far too much credit to Ahmadinejad in particular?

2) I think your statement that " Iran’s unwillingness to compromise is not for gaining more leverage in the negotiations, but rather to complete its nuclear program" is missing several key points.

To begin with, Iran's program is still far from providing a latent nuclear weapons capacity. Despite recent advances, with the technical challenges they have been having they are still two or more years from a latent weapons capacity. Even then, they would have to kick out the IAEA before even beginning the 6mnth or more sprint to produce enough HEU with P1 centrifuges to make even 1 small bomb -- hardly making them a regional superpower! In other words, they have a LONG way to go to get there. Pushing to 3000 centrifuges does not give them significant bomb-making capability.

Secondly, there are many factions within Iran that are better represented at the Expediency Council level -- and in the nuclear negotiations led by Larijani (which Ahmadinejad has no control over) -- that favor a pragmatic negotiated solution... one that allows Iran to maintain enrichment capabilities, but that also defuses tensions and helps build stronger economic relations with the EU and China. After all, the domestic Iranian economy is still a mess.

If you listen to Ahmadinejad alone, it does look like Iran is simply running towards nukes. However, that is the danger of looking at him alone. There are many moderate elements with MORE influence than Ahmadinejad that can be appealed to.

Continuing to push with hard sanctions only gives more credibility to Ahmadinejad's anti-West rhetoric and disempowers the moderates. Rather, the EU should be developing a new strategy of engagement -- one that includes discussing with Iran real alternative solutions that all Iran to maintain some publicly face-saving level of enrichment on Iranian soil.

(Manjana Milkoreit and I outlined the arguments for such a strategy in a recent AC piece: http://www.atlantic-community.org/index.php/articles/view/No_Sancti...

I look forward to your comments.

Best regards,
jason

October 21, 2007

Dustin Dehez, Düsseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy (DIAS), (2)

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Dear Jason,

First of all, I’d like to thank you for your thoughtful comments on our piece. And furthermore I do believe that your questions are highlighting two very important factors:

1) You are absolutely right, Ahmadinejad is not as powerful as it might seem at first glance. The political guidelines for the development of Iran are being put forward by Chamenei and following Ahmadinejad’s electoral victory Chamenei re-balanced the Iranian power structures by giving the Expediency Council even more rights than it alredy held. On that point I would even go so far and try to make a thesis: The fact that the Supreme Leader is not elected by the people, while the President, who cannot take major policy changes on his own, is makes reform particularily difficult. From a historical perspective, that is why I believe Kenneth Pollack has a point when stating that the Iranian regime will not survive in the long run: Reforms are historically speaking the change every government has to foster if it wants to prevent a revolution. That is perhaps a little overstated but it might shed some light on how sophisticated the political landscape in Iran is.

2) On the second point I am convinced that there are a couple of issues one should be aware of, and while I agree on some of your comments, I am overall more sceptical on the possibility to settle the nuclear crisis peacefully.
First, you are right in pointing out that Iran still has long way to go, before they actually have a nuclear weapons capability. Second, again you are right in stressing the fact that Ahmadinejad has no direct influence on the nuclear negotiations and that therefore one should not put to much emphasis on what he is saying. However, and here I tend do disagree a little, that does not mean that he is isolated in his position. Quite on the contrary, because he is not in command of the negotiations one should all the more be sceptical about Iran’s intentions. The nuclear programme started long before Ahmadinejad came to power and the programme is carried by a political consensus in the Iranian political elite. There are certainly some who would be willing to reach a compromise, but in the final analysis they did not start the programme to reach a settlement abandoning it in the first place. I’d like to proceed in two steps. First of all, I think there can hardly be any doubt that Iran is developing a nuclear weapons capability – in contrast to the case of Iraq the IAEA says Iran is non-compliant, what motive for non-compliance can there be other than having something to hide? Second, Iran is surrounded by nucelar powers and the Europeans like to stress the fact that nucelar deterrence has guruanteed peace for fifty years, against this background I’d quite understand Iranians saying, well than lets have it too. But here, I think there are two different schools of thought, the first arguing as we’ve have no prove of a nuclear arms programme yet we should give the Iranians the benefit of a doubt. The second stressing the fact that Iran has been so resolutely denying the IAEA access to its facilities and that is has been so uncompromising there simply must be more to its nuclear programme than just the desire to produce electricity. I tend to agree with the latter position.

Finally I’d like to make a rather personal remark: I have often heard, that the EU should now really enter into negotiations that offer Iran real alternative solutions. I think what the EU has offered over the course of the past years has been far more than one could possibly ask for, it has after all already been a real alternative solution. I think its time to ask why Iran is not taking one of the bridges we’ve build in the past years and the answer I guess will be a frustrating one for all interested in peace.

I look forward to taking the discussion a step further,

All the best,
Dustin

October 22, 2007

Oliver Hauss, -, Gold Contributor (112)

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Dustin,

you ask "in contrast to the case of Iraq the IAEA says Iran is non-compliant, what motive for non-compliance can there be other than having something to hide? "

The same that Iraq had not to seem TOO compliant: Appearing strong and signalling to your neighbors that you actually might have something to hide and that they shouldn't hedge their bets. The very notion that they COULD have those weapons is enough for the deterrent effect that you note.