Russia’s policy towards China has been one of adaptation and accommodation. Despite increasing asymmetry in power between the two states, Moscow and Beijing have reinforced cooperation and managed to overcome a number of challenges. At the same time, Russia and China have not transformed their relationship into a fully-fledged alliance.
Welcome to ‘What we’re reading’ – our new reading list on Atlantic Community. We would like to use this feature to share and highlight interesting, engaging, thought-provoking papers and podcasts on the state of transatlantic relations.
Through its “Made in China 2025” industry strategy, China is making great strides to become the global leader in high-tech industries and manufacturing. The initiative was launched in 2015 as part of a government funded effort for Beijing to achieve its goal of surpassing the likes of the US and Germany to dominate global tech and automation by 2049
Let’s be traditional first: The main purpose of the transatlantic relationship in the 21st century will look familiar to those who have studied its history since 1949: To prevent a situation from emerging in which Europeans feel they need to call Moscow first, instead of Washington, in questions of international politics. Add Beijing to the equation, and you get an idea of how daunting the task will be.
Transatlantic relations are the permanent suspension of conventional geopolitics for the purpose of limiting other powers’ influence over a Europe they could otherwise own. Look at the map, and you understand that, based on size, wealth, population and location, it is Russia that should dominate Western and Central Europe. It does not do so because America’s presence and promise of security to Europe creates an artificial barrier that Moscow has been unable to overcome since the end of World War II. With NATO and EU expansion, this barrier has moved eastward by a few hundred kilometers, and this is where, if all goes well, it will remain for some time to come.