President Trump’s last international trip to the G7 Summit resulted in the worst meeting of its kind since its inception, given his outburst at America’s usual allies, and was compounded by the contrast a day later with his cordial meeting with North Korea’s Kim Jung Un in Singapore. Many Transatlanticists were prepared for the worst as Trump made his way to NATO and the UK before seeing Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki. The good news, is that the NATO summit went better than expected, though many commentators still called it the worst in history. The bad news, however, is that despite lowered expectations, damage was still done to transatlantic relations. The question now is: how severe and long-lasting will this damage be?
Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin both celebrate the summit in Helsinki as a success, showing once again their mastery of public relations. Cold negotiating Putin and the intuitive American president seem to have dealt with several open conflicts in a constructive manner. Yet, their logic of geopolitics and zero-sum games doesn’t allow for much long-term détente – lest for their European partners.
NATO summits are usually highly organized events. Heads of State and Government adopt previously negotiated decisions and define work plans up to the next summit. Above all, they aim to demonstrate unity and solidarity so that friend and foe alike believe that the NATO allies will defend each other in the event of a crisis. But this summit threatens to disrupt this process, because no one knows how US President Trump will behave. Will we see a revival of a brash Mr. Trump G7 Summit when the US President retrospectively ‘unsigned’ the communiqué via tweet? Or will he act as a patriarch, whose stubborn grumblings are ultimately met with cooperation, and keep the family bound together?
Like most members of the Atlantic Alliance, Norway has been unsettled by the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Policymakers and commentators struggle to understand how Trump’s Washington works. Most unsettling, perhaps, is the overall impression that in an ever more complex world and in an ever more challenging security environment, Norway’s most important ally fails to show leadership. Instead, Trump is unraveling the multilateral order on which countries like Norway rely.
In a very intense and thought-provoking week in April, 30 American and German fellows gathered in Berlin to present their strategies and concrete projects aimed at modernizing transatlantic relations in the form of an Atlantic Action Plan. The 30 fellows taking part in the Atlantic Basecamp represent a fine selection of the two previous Expeditions and cover a broad range of professional backgrounds – from economics and law, to governmental policies and banking, to journalism and international institutions as young professionals or advanced students. Their diverse and multidisciplinary expertise has been a crucial asset in developing policy and communication recommendation.
Germany and the United States have a deeply intertwined relationship, historically, politically, economically, and culturally. The end of the Cold War, however, has arguably catalyzed a transition to a new world order, in which Germany has broken away from its traditional dependence on the West, the so-called Westbindung. Given the two divided camps of thought this development has caused, this thesis analyzes if, how, and to what extent the German-American relationship has changed. I evaluate the German-American relationship of recent years in three dimensions: Germany’s military actions and role in international crises compared to those of the United States, in respect to the Iraq, Libya, Ukraine, and Syria conflicts; Germany’s economic policies and preferences regarding the TTIP; and German public opinion of the transatlantic relationship. To inform my thesis, I conducted a literature review of existing academic opinion on the subject, analyzed German media coverage of the case studies in question and extracted data from polls conducted of German citizens. I conclude that a break from Atlanticism is unlikely, as doing so would contradict Germany’s core economic and political interests.