In March 2019 defence ministers from eight European countries traveled to London to discuss deepening cooperation. But the cooperation they discussed was related to neither the EU nor NATO. The ministers were in London for a meeting of the Joint Expeditionary Force, a standing force led by the United Kingdom. After Brexit, Britain is set to expand such regional cooperation. It’s a win-win.
“Like-minded nations must come together to increase their own security. That is why the United Kingdom is leading the nine-nation Joint Expeditionary Force which in a few months’ time will take part in its first deployment to the Baltics,” UK Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson said in a speech at RUSI – the London think tank whose Modern Deterrence project I lead – in February. The Joint Expeditionary Force, known as JEF, can be deployed both within Europe and globally, both on purely military missions and during humanitarian crises. It consists of nine countries; in addition to the UK, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland and Sweden. Compared to the EU’s soon-to-be 27 countries, it’s a modest number. But unlike the EU’s battlegroups, which have never been deployed, the JEF is now on its way to the Baltics.
Britain is leaving the EU just as the EU is getting serious about defence cooperation; indeed, the fact that it’s getting serious about defence cooperation is linked to the departure of Britain, which consistently opposed such steps. With the UK out of the picture, the remaining EU members can integrate their defence at liberty. That leaves the UK the sole outsider, a loser as European allies form the closer union that’s necessary in order to maximise the region’s collective might.
Right? Not so fast. Despite recent European efforts at integration within the EU, an EU Army is simply not happening, though the term remains a favourite tool of scaremongering Brexiteers. NATO clearly remains the bedrock of European defence. Military cooperation between British and the EU will not be dead with Brexit; on the contrary, it will be in both sides’ interest for their forces to cooperate, especially in case of a major crisis in Europe. Britain, of course, needs European allies, and the Europeans need Britain’s military expertise, not to mention its hardware. According to the Munich Security Report 2019, the UK has 44 percent of all heavy transport aircraft, 17 percent of all vehicle-launched bridges and 18 percent of all frigates in the EU. (The Withdrawal Agreement’s political declaration doesn’t specify what such cooperation would look like.)
Real military integration in Europe is, however, happening bottom-up, between individual countries. The Dutch Army has incorporated its 43rd Mechanised Brigade into the Bundeswehr’s 1st Panzer Division – a hitherto unthinkable feat. (German units are, in turn, integrated into the 43rd Mechanised Brigade.) The Swedish and Finnish air forces, meanwhile, work so closely together that they use each other’s air fields and take turns playing the read team.
“We will build new alliances, rekindle old ones and most importantly make it clear that we are the country that will act when required. We should be the nation that people turn to when the world needs leadership. And defence will be pivotal in reinforcing Britain’s role as an outward-looking nation,” Williamson said in his RUSI speech. Indeed, leaving the EU will force the UK to raise its global profile; the UK government has made Global Britain its new motto. The declining manufacturing industry is hardly a standard-bearer for Global Britain. Neither is the financial sector, which has a strong presence in London but is far from British. Britain’s armed forces are, however, first-rate and have a long history of international engagement. In his RUSI speech, Williamson argued that “in an era of Great Power competition we cannot be satisfied simply protecting our own backyard. The UK is a global power with truly global interests.”
The UK, then, appears on ready to stake its international position on its armed forces. After Brexit it could form JEF-style arrangements with other countries, both within and outside Europe. In addition to the JEF, the UK operates the so-called Combined Joint Task Force with France. The Royal Navy, for example, has global ambitions and a global history, but lacks funding to maintain a permanent global presence. The UK could, for example, forge closer naval cooperation with Australia and New Zealand. That would also benefit the West’s strategy of keeping a closer eye on Chinese expansionist ambitions in its neighbourhood.
The British Army, meanwhile, form partnerships with junior partner along the lines of Germany and the Netherlands’ tank division integration. (Germany is the current leader of such so-called framework nation integration, which includes one senior and at least one junior partner.) Given that Britain is an island the question is, of course, which countries would be able to integrate one of their army units with the British Army. An option would be basing a larger British Army unit – realistically a brigade – in the partner country. To maximise the military and geopolitical usefulness of such a move, the partner would have to be a continental European country. Such an arrangement would also help Britain maintain a military presence in Europe. In 2015, the British Army announced that all troops currently based in Germany will be withdrawn by 2020.
The UK could also form JEF-style groupings with likeminded partners within NATO. (The JEF includes two countries that are not members of NATO.) That would not be in competition to NATO but rather a supplement to it. Such a move would also recognise the self-evident reality that a 30-member alliance cannot meet every security need of its extremely diverse members.
Britain’s two new aircraft carriers, which cost £6.4 billion and entered service after a decade where the UK had no aircraft carriers, symbolise Britain’s global ambition. But one can ask why Britain needs a global military presence of the kind Mr Williamson has outlined. When you have two new aircraft carriers, every problem may start looking like one that needs to be solved by two aircraft carriers. Expanding a military presence, even just through partnerships, is costly. Dutch-German style integration, meanwhile, is extremely complex and only possible among close allies with matching needs. Indeed, is a global British military presence needed by the global community or is it merely an attempt by a dwindling power to project big-power status? Another strategy would be for Britain to accept its mid-size power status and reduce, not expand, its military ambitions. Until recently no British politician have dared articulate such a strategy. Were Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn to win the next election, it would be a distinct possibility.
But realistically, not even Mr Corbyn would deliberately dismantle a rare UK success story, especially one that creates tens of thousands of jobs, not just in the armed forces but in support services and the defence industry as well. Global Britain may not turn out as rosy as Mr Williamson hopes, but Britain is certain to try. Expect more JEF-inspired small alliances.
–
Elisabeth Braw is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) where she directs the Modern Deterrence programme which focuses on how governments, business and civil society can work together to strengthen our defence against existing and emerging threats.
—
Photo: Crown Copyright 2017 OGL (Open Government Licence).
