Since the United Kingdom officially left the EU, the Scottish independence movement has as much momentum as it has ever had before. As such, the
Assuming the UK and EU stick to their respective red lines on sovereignty and autonomy, a future security partnership is likely to be modeled technically on ones the EU already has. In this case, even an EU-UK security partnership unprecedented in ambition will fall well short of the cooperation reserved for EU members—at a time when that cooperation is becoming more consequential in the global arena.
“Europe is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one” were the opening words of a 1982 article by
Security does and will continue to play a role in the Brexit negotiations. The main risk is that an acrimonious divorce could sour discussions to develop a strong and comprehensive EU-UK security partnership. It is in both the British and the European interest that this does not occur.
Although EU strategic autonomy and European strategic autonomy are different issues, one is likely the condition for the other, and vice versa. From outside the European Union, the United Kingdom would have a strong case to make that European strategic autonomy is a prerequisite of European security, and indeed a necessary precondition of EU strategic autonomy.
Britain is leaving the EU just as the EU is getting serious about defence cooperation; indeed, the fact that it’s getting serious about defence cooperation is linked to the departure of Britain, which consistently opposed such steps. With the UK out of the picture, the remaining EU members can integrate their defence at liberty. That leaves the UK the sole outsider, a loser as European allies form the closer union that’s necessary in order to maximise the region’s collective might.
Since the 1980s, British-German cooperation was referred to by observers in both London and Bonn (later Berlin), as the ‘quiet alliance’ (stille Allianz). A partnership
. While London certainly has to end the uncertainty over its exit and avoid a no-deal outcome, from the EU side, Brussels should resist impatience, move beyond bureaucratic technicalities and think of Brexit and its impact on European defence and security as a strategic issue. Ultimately, ensuring continuous cooperation is in the interest of both sides.
The Western Balkans, might be right in the European Union’s backyard, however the region is geographically remote from the UK, and could become a testing ground for continued cooperation in foreign and security policy as a result. Since their interests are fundamentally aligned the EU-27 and the UK should be able to speak with one voice.
Europe’s security architecture has significantly changed over the past ten years. The deteriorating security situation around Europe prompted a movement to remodel European security architecture,
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